The EPA has designed a new call auction institution for trading allowances to emit sulfur dioxide. This paper reports twelve laboratory markets that evaluate the performance of this new institution relative to the more commonly observed uniform price call auction. We find Ž . Ž . that the uniform price call auction i is more efficient, ii induces more truthful revelation of Ž . Ž . underlying values and costs, iii provides more accurate price information, and iv is more responsive to changes in underlying market conditions. Under the EPA auction rules both buyers and sellers misrepresent their true value of the emission permits, which biases market-clearing prices downward. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION
The centerpiece of the acid rain control program in the Clean Air Act Amend-Ž . ments of 1990 ''the Act'' is a system of tradable emission permits. Utilities must hold permits to emit sulfur dioxide, and the number of available permits will decline over time to reduce total emissions. Permit trading provides a more flexible means to achieve air quality objectives, in theory minimizing the overall cost of Ž . emission reductions. To ensure the availability of the permits or, ''allowances'' and to provide clear price signals to the evolving allowance market, the Act charges Ž . the Environmental Protection Agency EPA with the responsibility to conduct annual call auctions. 2 The Chicago Board of Trade conducted the first call auction for EPA in March 1993.
The research reported in this paper is motivated by the special features of the EPA call market. The Act states that ''allowances shall be sold on the basis of bid 1 Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. Seema Arora provided valuable research assistance. Mark Van Boening, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Washington University, the 1993 Western Economic Association, the 1993 Economic Science Association, and the 1993 Southern Economic Association Conferences provided helpful comments on an earlier draft. 2 Ž . In the call market institution, potential buyers submit sealed bids specifying their maximum Ž . Ž . willingness-to-pay for the commodity, and potential sellers submit sealed offers or asks indicating the w minimum price they are willing to accept for the commodity. One can think of these bids and asks as x ''limit orders,'' which may specify different prices for different units. The market is ''called'' and trades are executed for all units with bids exceeding asks at a specific, preannounced time using a previously specified rule for determining the price of each trade.
price, starting with the highest-priced bid and continuing until all allowances for Ž . 3 sale at such auction have been allocated'' emphasis added . The EPA has interpreted this provision as requiring a discriminative auction with a unique feature: All sellers in this market receive the bid price of a specific buyer. Each successful buyer pays his or her own bid price, and sellers with the lowest asking prices receive the highest bids. Each bid and ask affects transaction prices, which creates strong incentives for traders to strategically manipulate the market. In contrast, call market institutions on financial exchanges have a uniform price rule that limits the traders' abilities and incentives to manipulate price. Modern theory suggests that such features of the price determination process can have an impact on the actual prices.
This paper reports twelve laboratory markets that investigate trader behavior in this new institution and evaluate its performance relative to the more commonly observed uniform price call market. We find that the uniform price version of the Ž . Ž . call market i is more efficient, ii induces more truthful revelation of underlying Ž .
Ž . values and costs, iii provides more accurate price information, and iv is more responsive to and recovers more quickly from changes in underlying market conditions. All of these differences are due to the intense strategic manipulation incentives of the EPA auction. Under the EPA auction rules both buyers and sellers misrepresent their true value of the emission permits, so market-clearing prices are biased downward. This suggests that the EPA-sponsored auction may provide poor price signals to the evolving allowance market, and may not provide accurate price information to firms that develop new technologies to control emissions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the EPA auction and uniform price auction rules. Section 3 describes the experimental environment and treatment conditions. Section 4 discusses the experimental design, and Section 5 offers theoretical predictions for the different environments and trading institutions. Section 6 contains the experimental results and Section 7 concludes.
THE EPA AUCTION AND THE UNIFORM PRICE CALL AUCTION
The acid rain provisions of the Act primarily affect electric utilities, at least prior Ž . to 1999 i.e., during ''Phase I'' . A sulfur dioxide allowance authorizes the emission of up to 1 ton of sulfur dioxide, and beginning in 1995 the total annual emissions of each generating unit must be less than or equal to the number of permits held for that unit. Allowances may be transferred to and from any generating unit or any person. Consequently, each utility may meet its sulfur dioxide limitation in the most efficient means possible, either by choosing the most cost-effective emission control technology or buying emission permits from units with lower emission control costs. To maintain a cap on total emissions, new generation capacity must obtain allowances from existing allowance holders or through the EPA auctions and sales programs.
The EPA holds two separate call auctions during March of each year: A spot auction for permits allocated for the current year and an ad¨ance auction for permits effective in seven years. The Act allows any person holding permits to sell Ž . those permits in the auctions held by the EPA, but requires that the reserve permits in EPA's auction subaccount be sold before any private offerings. This subaccount contains allowances withheld from each utility's annual allowance allocation, and the EPA essentially forces these allowances into the auction with an asking price of zero. The number of permits in this subaccount in each of the two annual auctions varies from 150,000 to 250,000 between 1993 and 1999, but is Ž . set at 200,000 after 1999 i.e., in ''Phase II'' . These ''mandatory'' units are intended to ensure a minimum trading volume and represent 2.24% of the total permits allocated each year. The experiments do not include these mandatory units in order to focus on the incentives of the voluntary units offered for sale. 4 These auctions are two-sidedᎏwith both bids to buy and offers to sellᎏbut the EPA interprets the Act to require successful buyers to pay their respective bids. The prices paid are determined as follows: 5 All bids to the auctions will be ranked from highest to lowest on the basis of bid price. EPA will allocate and sell all the allowances in the auction subaccount on the basis of this ranking: when all such allowances are sold, EPA will match contributed allowances offered for sale with any remaining bids. Specifically, EPA proposes to match the offer to sell that stipulates the lowest minimum price with the highest remaining bid. This matching process will continue in ascending order of specified minimum price until all bids are awarded or allowances are consumed, or until EPA can no longer match bids with allowances because sellers have set their minimum price higher than any remaining bids.
In other words, the bids are arranged from highest to lowest, and the asks are arranged from lowest to highest. The lowest ask is matched with the highest bid and the trade occurs at the bid price; that is, units sold in this matching scheme receive the bid price of a specific buyer. Lower asking prices receive higher trading priority and thus lead to higher received prices, and all transacting bids and asks Ž . affect the different transaction prices.
In contrast to the EPA auction, specialists on the NYSE set the daily opening price for each share with a uniform price call auction. 6 This auction is also common on exchanges worldwide for securities that have low trading volume, including stock exchanges in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Israel. The auctioneer aggregates and arrays all bids and asks as revealed demand and supply schedules, and all trades occur at a uniform price where these schedules intersect. Only the Ž . bids and asks near the margin affect the uniform transaction price. The uniform price auction shares an important desirable feature with the EPA auction: low administrative costs because of their discrete nature compared to auction institu- 4 Alternatively, we could interpret the buyers in the experiment as the utilities demanding additional permits after the EPA sells the first 200,000 mandatory units. Including the mandatory units would simply shift the voluntary supply of units in the auction to the right by the number of mandatory units. w x ICF Resources 11 estimated that cost savings from trading will fall in the range of $1 billion per year, which would require total trading volume of several million units at current and projected permit prices in the $150 to $300 range. The number of units traded in the EPA auction will depend on the development of other private markets for allowances. 5 w x w x Federal Register 7 , page 23746. The final rules published in the Federal Register 8 do not modify this proposal. 6 This institution is also used to set opening prices on the American and Tokyo stock exchanges.
tions that are open continuously. For this reason, as well as its extensive use on organized exchanges, the uniform price auction is a logical alternative institution for comparison.
EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENTS AND PROCEDURES

En¨ironments
A total of 12 sessions were conducted. Different sessions implement the two different call auction institutions. Eight sessions implemented the EPA auction rules described above. Four sessions implemented the uniform price auction commonly observed on financial markets.
Different sessions employed two different economic environments to capture two somewhat polar cases in which the auctions might need to function in the field. Since the theory of the EPA auction is not fully developed it is necessary to rely more heavily on the robustness of any properties observed. The only means available to this end is a proper choice of experimental environments. For this purpose we chose one environment in which the aggregate demands and supplies Ž . were constant for several periods we called this the constant aggregate case and a second environment in which the demands and supplies of each individual were Ž . drawn randomly each period we call this the random draws case .
Each session was conducted for 24 market periods. In the constant aggregate case the aggregate demand and supply were constant for 16 periods and then were shifted once without warning. Figure 1 presents the aggregate demand and supply for this environment. Although the market aggregates were constant, the individual demands and supplies were rotated across subjects from period to period. In the Ž random draws case, individual values were drawn from a uniform distribution with . replacement each period. The distribution range remained constant for the first 16 periods and was shifted for the final 8 periods. This shift was announced. We imposed these sudden changes in the environment to study the possible evolution of the system to a new equilibrium. 7 Table I summarizes the parameters for the 12 sessions. An x in the experiment name denotes the experienced sessions. Inexperienced subjects had never before participated in a two-sided auction market experiment. Section 4 below discusses the experiment design.
Procedural Details
Each session employed eight students drawn from upper division economics classes at USC. The subjects were typically economics and business majors in their junior and senior years. Upon arriving at the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned a buyer or seller role and a PC. Subjects remained in the same role throughout the session, and each had a trading capacity of four units per period. Buyers earned profits by purchasing units at prices below their ''resale values'' and sellers earned profits by selling units at prices above their ''costs.'' Note that unlike Ž some previous laboratory research concerning emission permit trading e.g., Franw x w x. ciosi et al. 9 and Cronshaw and Brown Kruse 5 , the subjects do not acquire permits in order to produce. We employed a simplified, abstract trading commodity environment because our research interest is the alternative trading institutions.
Ž . At the beginning of each session, buyers resp., sellers received a record sheet Ž . that indicated in cents the resale values costs for their four units for all 24 market w periods. Subjects also participated in an initial practice period to learn the x Ž . operating procedures of the market software. During the period, buyers sellers 7 For example, in the year 2000 the Act scales back the total permitted emissions to less than 9 million tons. Although traders know this emissions cap, its implication for permit values is uncertain. Traders will foresee some of the price implication through permit futures prices. We announced the shift in the random draws case because common knowledge of the distribution of possible values is required for any characterizations of a Bayesian᎐Nash equilibrium. We did not announce the shift in Ž . the constant aggregate case because i subjects never receive value and cost information in constant Ž . parameter experiments and ii we were interested in studying the adjustment path to a new, unknown Ž . to subjects equilibrium under the extreme equilibrium strategies of the EPA auction. filled out electronic ''bid sheets'' indicating their maximum willingness-to-pay Ž . minimum willingness-to-accept for their four units. They could enter separate offers for each of their units or multiple-unit offers if they wished. The only Ž . requirements were that the total number of units bid for or offered was less than or equal to four and that every bid or ask price was greater than or equal to 1¢. Once subjects entered all bids and asks the experimenter called the market. Bids were arrayed from highest to lowest and asks from lowest to highest. Ties were broken randomly. A trade occurred between all bid᎐ask pairs in which the bid was greater than or equal to the ask. In the EPA auction sessions the different bids determined the different transaction prices, and in the uniform price sessions the Ž . midpoint of the market-clearing price interval determined the common, uniform price. The computer reported all the bids, asks, prices, and trading volume to all the subjects. Therefore, similar to the EPA auction implemented in the field, all Ž . bids, asks, and prices but of course not underlying true values and costs were public information after the market call. Subjects entered the price information for their traded units on their record sheets and calculated their trading profits by hand. The experimenter carefully monitored these calculations. Subjects began with a $5 starting capital credit balance to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcies Ž . from early losses bankruptcies never occurred , and all trading profits for the 24 market periods were added to this starting balance. Sessions required 90 to 120 Ž . minutes to complete including instructions , and subject earnings ranged from $14 to $50, with a mean of about $33. Experiment instructions are available on request Ž w x. or see Cason and Plott 3 . Figure 2 summarizes the different treatment conditions and the location of the twelve sessions in different treatment cells. The design is obviously incomplete, but we chose to gather data in several conditions in order to compare the trading institutions in multiple environments. Behavior varied little across sessions within a treatment cell, so the small number of replications is unlikely to be misleading. Note also that the design is unbalanced. We only conducted four uniform price w x sessions because this institution has been studied extensively by Smith et al. 15 , control for nuisance parameters such as the subject pool, experimenter, instructions, and laboratory market software. The results are broadly consistent with earlier laboratory research and theoretical models of this institution, so we felt comfortable focusing the limited resources on the unique EPA auction institution. Nevertheless, the four uniform price sessions provide comparison results for the EPA auction sessions that hold controllable nuisance parameters constant.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experience treatment also requires discussion. Our main interest concerns trader and market behavior after subjects understand the rules of the EPA trading institution, and not the learning process itself. The random draws case presents a more complex decision environment, so most random draws sessions employed experienced subjects. Additional experienced sessions in the constant aggregate case would be unlikely to add much insight, because behavior converged to and remained near the theoretical equilibrium after the first few inexperienced periods in all sessions. We did conduct one inexperienced random draws session to determine if the environment in which subjects receive experience has an impor-Ž . tant impact on behavior. This inexperienced session EPARan5 generally had lower prices and efficiency than the comparable experienced random draws EPA auction sessions, so we believe subject experience is important. However, performance of this group of subjects in the experienced session EPARan6x is indistinguishable from the other experienced EPA auction sessions, which indicates that the source of experience is not important.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that although the experiment varies both experience and the constant versus random draws environments concurrently, we are not Ž . confounding the key treatment variable of interest the trading institution . The data analysis for the institutional comparison only compares observations from the different auction institutions in identical experience and value draw conditions. The results identify similar institutional behavior and performance differences for Ž .
Ž . i inexperienced subjects in the constant aggregate environment and ii experienced subjects in the random draws environment. The institutional differences we identify are stronger because they are present in different environment and experience settings. Both our results and our theoretical understanding make it highly unlikely that the experienced constant aggregate or the inexperienced random draw conditions hold anything interesting for study.
MODELS
A difficulty exists with applying general models from auction theory. The EPA auction is so complicated that a general game-theoretic solution to the natural auction model is unknown to us. In view of this problem we chose a setting in the constant aggregate case in which a Nash equilibrium exists to the EPA auction. The existence results from a strategic choice of parameters. However, the natural model to apply to the uniform price auction becomes complicated because of the multiple units. For convenience of analysis we have chosen to assume that traders enter separate bids and asks for each unit. Of course that assumption can be evaluated using the data. The random draws case presents even more modeling problems that will be discussed below. The experimental design and the data analysis were developed in full realization of the difficulties caused by the lack of fully developed models, which of course is a frequent problem in economics.
EPA Auction in Constant Aggregate Case
Subjects in the constant aggregate sessions knew only their own values or costs, but over time they learned about the overall market conditions through bids, asks, prices, and trading volume. In particular, in the constant aggregate case subjects observe the evolution of market-clearing prices, and these prices appear to con-Ž . 8 verge to the lower bound of the competitive equilibrium price interval P . CE w x w x Following Smith et al. 15 and Miller and Plott 13 we describe a static Nash equilibrium bidding model under certainty and assume that each trader knows P . 9 With the demand and supply conditions shown in Fig. 1 it is easy to identify CE Nash equilibrium strategies, although these strategies are not unique. Notice that these schedules have the very special feature that at P s 220 the supply CE intersects the demand but there are extra, ''hangover'' demand units. These extra-marginal units are important for the features of the Nash equilibrium. 10 First consider the problem facing a buyer with reservation value¨. Bids aboveä re never optimal under the EPA rules because buyers must pay their bid price if their bid is accepted. Bids at or below 220 can be beat or tied by extra-marginal buyers with¨s 220. All bids above 220 q 1¢ will be accepted, so the buyer with Ž ) 220 has an incentive to bid exactly b s 220 q 1¢ 1¢ is the smallest possible . increment . The Nash equilibrium requires that if¨s 220 then b s¨even though these bids are not accepted. For all¨-220 the buyer is indifferent between any Ž . bid less than¨because her bid is not accepted.
Next consider the problem facing a seller with cost c. Under the EPA rules the sellers with the lowest ask prices receive the highest bids. If c F 220 and if 10 buyers bid 220 q 1¢ then this seller is indifferent between any ask between Ž . 220 q 1¢ and the lower bound 1¢, because in equilibrium this ask will be accepted and will receive a bid price of 220 q 1¢. However, if any dispersion exists in bid prices above 220 then this seller strictly prefers an ask on the lower bound of 1¢ because this increases the expected price received. Therefore, an ask of 1¢ is Ž . perhaps weakly optimal for sellers with c F 220. If c ) 220 then the seller is Ž . indifferent between any ask greater than 220 q 1¢ because all bids are less than or equal to 220 q 1¢, and therefore the ask will not be accepted. w To summarize, our candidate equilibrium bid and ask strategies respectively, Ž .
Ž .x b¨and a c in the constant aggregate case are the following:
½ any a ) 220 q 1¢ for c ) 220 8 Alternatively, we could develop a dynamic model similar to the argument presented below replacing P with the market-clearing price in the previous period, P . CE ty1 9 w x Friedman and Ostroy 10 provide a theoretical justification for this ''as if'' complete information w x approach based on Dubey 6 and others. 10 The discussion that follows uses the parameters employed in periods 1᎐16 of the sessions. Figure 3 illustrates these strategies for the constant aggregate parameters of Ž periods 1᎐16. We refer to the bid strategy as the ''elbow'' strategy a term coined w x. by Miller and Plott 13 and the ask strategy as the ''jump'' strategy. It is Ž . straightforward to verify that these strategies constitute a nonunique Nash equilibrium. Because sellers ask 1¢, it might appear that buyers could exploit sellers by entering very low bids; however, the extra-marginal buyers discipline the infra-marginal buyers to bid no less that 220 q 1¢. Note that in spite of their substantial value and cost misrepresentation, these strategies imply high trading efficiency.
Uniform Price Auction in Constant Aggregate Case w x
Smith et al. 15 discusses the theoretical properties of the uniform price auction with constant values. Traders in this institution also have an incentive to misrepre-Ž . Ž . sent their values and costs. Lower bids higher asks imply lower higher prices, so Ž . Ž . buyers sellers never wish to bid above value ask below cost . The extra-marginal units, however, discipline the amount of profitable misrepresentation because they can displace profitable infra-marginal units. For example, in the parameters for periods 1᎐16 of the constant aggregate sessions infra-marginal buyers must bid no Ž . less than 220 to avoid being profitably displaced by one of the extra-marginal units. Similarly, infra-marginal sellers must ask no more than 240. The amount of misrepresentation can be significant for the high value and low cost units, but this Ž . misrepresentation is unlikely to affect the uniform price. The units near the margin that determine price should almost fully reveal values and costs to avoid being excluded from profitable trades. Any efficiency losses should be small in this institution because of the low profitability of the marginal units that may be excluded from trade.
Ž . F IG. 3. Elbow and jump strategies for the EPA auction periods 1᎐16 .
EPA Auction in Random Draws Case
The random draws case provides an environment that can, in theory, be formally modeled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information following the approach w x pioneered by Vickrey 18 for one-sided auctions. Each trader knows her own value or cost draw and the probability distribution governing the other traders' values and costs. Given these distributions and her beliefs regarding the bid and ask strategies employed by other traders, this trader can calculate the expected profit Ž . of any bid or ask. Each trader maximizes expected profit given these consistent beliefs regarding rival behavior, and if the strategies are mutual best-responses then they constitute a Bayesian᎐Nash equilibrium. Ž This approach is straightforward for one-sided auctions i.e., in which buyers . submit bids and the seller is nonstrategic , but it becomes considerably more complicated if both buyers and sellers are present as in the call auctions studied here. The EPA auction is theoretically complex because each bid and ask must be a best response to both the buyer and seller strategies, so traders' objective functions depend on the entire distribution of other traders' bids and asks. Cason w x 2 provides one approach to overcome this problem for the EPA auction by relying on some simplifying assumptions.
Because of these difficulties, we have not characterized an equilibrium for the EPA auction. However, we believe that we have the correct intuition for a theoretical equilibrium based on principles from auction theory. As discussed in w x more detail in Cason and Plott 3 , since buyers pay their bid price they face a strategic environment similar to the one-sided multiple-unit discriminative auction Ž . without strategic sellers studied theoretically and tested experimentally in Cox et w x al. 4 . This implies a bid function which has an elbow shape similar to the constant Ž . aggregate case. The Results section Fig. 12 provides support for this view. Successful sellers in this institution receive the bid price of a specific buyer. It can w x be shown that if values are drawn from 0, 250 and buyers bid according to the multiple-unit discriminative auction theory, then the expected price received for an ask of 1¢ is approximately 125. Therefore, the optimal ask for risk neutral sellers Ž . with low cost draws below some cutoff c* which is approximately 125 is the corner solution of 1¢. The optimal ask strategy for sellers with higher cost draws Ž . above c* is less clear, but we conjecture that there exists an optimal a c F c for all c ) c* that increases monotonically in c. Since this ask strategy is discontinuous at c*, it implies a jump strategy similar to the constant aggregate case. and ask functions. This truthful revelation implies that the market exploits nearly all available gains from exchange.
Uniform Price Auction in Random Draws
Models Summary
Table II summarizes the predicted behavior based on our understanding of the theoretical properties of these institutions. Predicted behavior is similar in both environments. In the EPA auction, theoretical considerations suggest an elbow shape for the buyers' bids and a discontinuous jump in the seller's asks. Predicted price in the constant aggregate environment under EPA auction rules is at the Ž bottom of the competitive equilibrium price interval P s 220 in periods 1᎐16, . P s 280 in periods 17᎐24 because the extra-marginal buyer values set the lower bound on acceptable bids. The theory predicts that market efficiency will be 100% in the constant aggregate case. In the random draws environment the EPA auction price may be less sensitive to underlying value and cost variation because the elbow and jump strategies may cause most of the accepted bids to lie in the 110᎐140 range regardless of the actual draws. In the uniform price auction, theory predicts that buyers and sellers reveal values and costs at the margin, implying prices in the competitive price interval and near 100% efficiency.
RESULTS
The primary conclusion of this experiment is that the EPA auction rules create strong incentives for both buyers and sellers to under-report their true cost of emissions control to the auction. Consequently, compared to the uniform price call auction, the EPA auction generates lower market-clearing prices and extracts less gains from exchange. We provide details for these results in three sections. The first section compares behavior and performance of the two institutions. The second section examines the overall market-level measures of behavior relative to the theoretical models of the two institutions. The patterns of market-level data revealed in the second section generally support the theoretical models. The final section contains a summary analysis of buyer and seller trading strategies. 
Institutional Comparisons
The analyses of this section involve simple comparisons of the two auction institutions that are independent of theory. In this section we present evidence that the uniform price rules outperform the EPA auction rules. The first comparison concerns the overall market efficiency of the two institutions and demonstrates that the uniform price auction dominates the EPA auction.
RESULT 1. Efficiency of the uniform price auction is greater than the efficiency of the EPA auction, except in the initial periods in the constant aggregate en¨ironment.
Support.
12
Figures 4 and 5 display average efficiency by period in the constant aggregate and random draws environments, respectively. In the constant aggregate Ž . environment Fig. 4 , the uniform price auction has lower efficiency initially, but efficiency improves steadily across periods. In contrast, the EPA auction efficiency is higher initially but shows little improvement over time. The EPA auction has higher average efficiency in the first 8 periods, but the uniform price auction has higher average efficiency in most of the final 16 periods. In the random draws Ž . environment Fig. 5 , the uniform price auction consistently has high efficiency while the EPA auction has serious performance deficiencies in many periods. The uniform price auction has higher average efficiency in 19 of the 24 periods in this environment. Overall, in the inexperienced constant aggregate environment, the EPA auction efficiency averages 89.7% compared to the uniform price average w x 13 efficiency of 90.9% T-statistic s 0.74 . The differences are more substantial in FIG. 4 . Average efficiency in constant aggregate environment. 12 As discussed in Section 4, in reporting all quantitative results we pool across the four experienced EPA auction, random draws sessions. We exclude the single inexperienced session EPARan5 in order to not confound the primary institutional treatment with experience and to provide a fair comparison across institutions. 13 Throughout this section we report T-statistics to aid in the reader's interpretation of the results.
However, the standard significance levels for the T-statistics are not valid because the observations are not independent across periods within a session. the experienced random draws environment; in this case, the EPA auction effiw ciency averages 91.5%, while the uniform price average efficiency is 96.2% T-stax tistic s 4.46 .
Not only is the efficiency of the EPA auction lower than the uniform price auction, but the EPA auction prices are lower as well. Define the market clearing price as the final transaction price at the margin when the auctioneer intersects the revealed supply and demand arrays. This is the most important price signal from the market because it reveals the marginal terms of trade buyers and sellers must meet in order to be included in the market transactions. It is also a widely distributed market summary statistic; for example, the Energy Daily and the Wall Ž . Street Journal mention the range of transaction prices $122 to $450 in the first and second sentences, respectively, of their articles reporting the initial EPA Ž auction results. Neither article even mentions the average price paid see Lobsenz w x w x. 12 and Taylor 16 . The next result compares these prices for the institutions relative to the competitive equilibrium prices.
RESULT 2. Prices of the uniform price auction are closer to the competiti¨e equilibrium prices and are higher than the market clearing prices of the EPA auction.
Support. Figures 6 and 7 display average market clearing prices by period in the constant aggregate and random draws environments, respectively. In the constant Ž . aggregate environment Fig. 6 , the uniform price auction provides average prices that almost perfectly correspond to the midpoint of the CE price interval. Average Ž . prices are always within the CE price interval with one exception in period 18 and average prices are nearly always within a couple of cents of the CE price interval midpoint. By comparison, the EPA auction average market clearing prices are always below the uniform price auction prices and always below the midpoint of the CE price interval. However, they do finally converge from below to the lower Ž . end of this interval 220 by period 14, as implied by the theoretical model. In the 
Ž
. random draws environment Fig. 7 , average market clearing prices in the EPA auction sessions are below the CE price interval midpoint in 23 out of 24 periods. The EPA auction average clearing prices fall below the lower bound of the CE Ž . price interval not shown in 20 out of 24 periods. Average prices are closer to the CE price interval in the uniform price institution in 17 of the 24 periods, and average prices are lower in the EPA auction sessions than the uniform price auction sessions in 22 out of 24 periods. The mean absolute deviation of market clearing price from the CE price interval midpoint is 20.5 cents in the EPA auction w x and is 8.6 cents in the uniform price auction T-statistic s 6.19 .
The next result compares the value and cost revelation implied by the bids and asks for the two institutions and indicates that these differences in market behavior arise from rather strong motivational tendencies that exist in these institutions. The EPA auction creates incentives for both the buyers and the sellers underreveal their true values and costs. In contrast, buyers and sellers in the uniform price auction are motivated toward truthful revelation.
RESULT 3. Value and cost re¨elation are greater under the uniform price auction than under the EPA auction.
Support. The statistics we employ to document this result are the mean absolute deviations of bids from value and asks from cost. In the constant aggregate environment, the mean absolute deviation from truthful revelation is smaller in the uniform price auction for all 24 periods for asks and for 20 out of 24 periods for w x bids. The mean bid deviation from revelation is smaller in all 16 final periods. In the random draws environment, the mean absolute deviation from truthful revelation is smaller in the uniform price auction for all 24 periods for both bids and asks.
Although the choice of the EPA auction rules is puzzling, it may be due to faulty Ž intuition about auction incentives the conclusion examines this issue in more . detail . There is evidence from House committee hearings on the Act that Congress chose discriminative price rules to increase the returns to the initial allowance holders, mainly large investor-owned electric utilities. 14 The next result compares the seller profits in the two institutions to determine if this objective is realized in the laboratory data. These results demonstrate that the discriminative pricing feature of the EPA auction rules fails to raise seller returns relative to uniform price rules, and these rules actually lower seller returns in the constant aggregate environment. This arises from the incentives to misrepresent values and costs in this setting.
The strategic behavior induced by the EPA auction rules can cause it to be unresponsive to underlying economic conditions. The next result summarizes the consequences when conditions change unexpectedly. How will the system respond if the economic parameters change without warning? Will the system respond to facilitate the gains from exchange that might exist under the new circumstances? Will prices reflect the new economic conditions? The constant aggregate sessions included the unannounced parameter shift between periods 16 and 17 to answer these questions.
RESULT 5. The efficiency le¨el immediately following an unexpected parameter change is higher in the uniform price auction than the EPA auction, and prices respond more rapidly in the uniform price auction.
Support. Consider again the efficiency and price comparison Figures 4 and 6 for the constant aggregate environment. After the unannounced parameter shift between periods 16 and 17 efficiency plummets in the EPA auction sessions and takes a couple of periods to recover. The market clearing price also reacts slowly to this parameter shift in the EPA auction sessions. In the uniform price sessions, efficiency falls only slightly and prices adjust much more quickly. Prices converge to the CE price midpoint in the uniform price auction within three periods, while market clearing prices never reach even the lower bound of the CE price interval in the EPA auction sessions during the 8 periods after the shift.
This unresponsiveness to changes in underlying conditions is a major difference between the institutions. The greater value and cost revelation of the uniform price Ž . auction Result 3 makes its price changes more sensitive to changes in these fundamentals. In the EPA auction, traders need to learn about the CE to extract full surplus and generate prices at the lower bound of the CE price interval; therefore, this institution does not respond quickly when underlying shifts generate uncertainty.
The substance of these five institutional comparison results is that the uniform price auction has higher efficiency than the EPA auction; the uniform price auction generates higher clearing prices that are closer to the competitive levels; sellers obtain no less and sometimes obtain more exchange surplus in the uniform price auction; and the uniform price auction prices convey more accurate information and are more responsive to changing conditions than the EPA auction prices. The next section examines the individual session data to evaluate the available theoretical models that might contribute to these properties.
Market Le¨el Data
Figures 8 through 11 contain eight trading periods of data from four representative sessions. Figure 8 contains the bids and asks for the first 8 periods of session EPACon2. This session employed the EPA auction rules and constant market demand and supply across periods. On these figures circles represent bids and Ž . squares represent asks. Solid black filled circles and squares indicate accepted Ž . bids and asks that resulted in transactions. White unfilled circles represent bids Ž . that were not accepted because they were matched with higher unfilled square asks. The dotted lines indicate the true redemption values and costs, ordered from highest to lowest and lowest to highest, respectively, and not in the order of the associated bids and asks. The solid horizontal line indicates the midpoint of the Ž . competitive equilibrium CE price interval. Figure 9 contains the bids and asks for Ž w x . F IG. 8. Session EPACon2 CE price interval 220, 240 ; periods 1᎐8.
Ž w x . F IG. 9. Session EPARan2x random draws from U 0, 250 ; periods 9᎐16. the middle 8 periods of session EPARan2x. In this session with EPA auction rules, subjects were experienced and the redemption values and costs were drawn w x randomly from the uniform distributions over 0, 250 . Figure 10 presents data from UNICon1, which is a constant aggregate, uniform price session. Figure 11 A glance at the figures suggests that the data from all experiments have the qualitative properties of the theory discussed in the Section 5. The first three results below attempt to make these impressions precise for the EPA auction. Results 9 and 10 address the uniform price auction, and essentially report that the data are consistent with the properties of the uniform price auction discussed above and results reported elsewhere.
Together Results 6 and 7 state that the trader behavior substantially confirms the Nash equilibrium predictions for the constant aggregate sessions. Furthermore, the elbow and jump models suggest properties of the data that are also observed in the random draws sessions. Figure 8 illustrates that sellers learn quickly in the inexperienced constant aggregate sessions to ask 1¢ in order to receive the highest bid prices. Sellers also employ this strategy immediately in the experienced random draws sessions. Buyers learn more slowly that bids near the lower bound of the CE price interval are high enough to trade. Some dispersion in accepted bids remains even at the end of every session, which makes low-cost sellers' 1¢ asks a strict best-response. Ž . buyer bids from the predicted Nash equilibrium elbow defined in Eq. 1 for the w constant aggregate sessions. For this calculation we employ a Nash prediction that extra-marginal bids equal values, although these bids are only bound by the CE x lower bound in equilibrium. This mean absolute deviation is 16.1¢ in the first 8 periods of the sessions, but falls to 9.5¢ in the second 8 periods of the sessions w x T -statistic for difference s 5.02 . The parameter shift between periods 16 and 17, however, increases the mean absolute deviation from the new Nash prediction to 15.3¢ for the final 8 periods.
In the random draws sessions, we calculate the average absolute deviation of bids from the Nash elbow approximation suggested by the multiple-unit discriminative auction bid function, as discussed above in Section 5.3. 15 The mean absolute deviation falls from 13.3¢ in the initial 8 periods to 10.4¢ in the second 8 periods of w x the sessions T-statistic s 3.67 . Like the parameter shift in the constant aggregate sessions, the distribution shift between periods 16 and 17 increases the mean absolute deviation from the new elbow prediction to 13.8¢ for the final 8 periods. Across both environments, it appears that bids move toward the elbow prediction under stable conditions; however, after parameter changes such as those following period 16, buyers require time to adjust to the new elbow equilibrium. This adjustment period apparently exceeds 8 periods.
RESULT 7. In the EPA auctions the ask data ha¨e the qualitati¨e properties of the jump model, and the mo¨ement of asks o¨er time is in the direction of the jump model.
Support. The qualitative properties are also clear from Figs. 8 and 9. We again calculate the average absolute deviation of seller asks from the predicted Nash Ž . equilibrium, in this case from the jump model defined in Eq. 2 for the constant w aggregate sessions. For this calculation we employ a Nash prediction that extramarginal asks equal costs, although these asks are only bound by the CE lower x bound in equilibrium. This mean absolute deviation falls from 67.7¢ in the first 8 w x periods to 45.9¢ in the second 8 periods T-statistic s 3.09 . The parameter shift between periods 16 and 17 increases the mean absolute deviation from the new Nash prediction to 107.9¢ for the final 8 periods, but two extreme asks in the final Ž . period 808 and 9999 entirely explain this increase. Dropping period 24, the mean absolute deviation for the periods 17᎐23 is 46.6¢.
In the random draws sessions, we calculate the average absolute deviation of asks from the following jump approximation:
where c is the highest possible cost drawᎏ250 in periods 1᎐16 and 300 in periods 17᎐24. The mean absolute deviation from this jump model falls from 25.3¢ in the w x initial 8 periods to 22.7¢ in the second 8 periods of the sessions T-statistic s 0.70 . The distribution shift between periods 16 and 17 increases the mean absolute deviation from the new jump prediction to 31.2¢ for the final 8 periods. 16 Like bids and the elbow model, it appears that asks move toward the jump prediction under Ž . stable conditions especially in the constant aggregate case but can diverge after parameter changes.
Results 6 and 7 suggest that the bids and asks are qualitatively consistent with our theoretical understanding of the incentives in the EPA auction institution. Result 2 indicates that prices in the EPA auction are below those of the uniform price auction. The next result states that the market clearing prices in the EPA auction are also systematically below the competitive equilibrium. Support. Across all 3 constant aggregate sessions, market clearing prices are below the CE price midpoint in all of the 72 periods. These prices are within the Ž . CE price interval in only 19 of the 72 periods 26% . In the 4 random draws sessions, market clearing prices are below the CE prices in 79 of the 96 periods Ž . Ž . 82% . Average market clearing prices by period are below the CE price interval midpoint in all 24 periods in the constant aggregate sessions, and in 23 of the 24 Ž . periods in the random draws sessions Figs. 6 and 7 . The market clearing price is always the lowest transaction price each period, so average transaction price always exceeds the market clearing price. Nevertheless, average prices are below the CE price interval midpoint in all 24 periods in the constant aggregate sessions. In the random draws sessions, average prices are below the CE price interval midpoint in 9 of the 24 periods.
These price results for the EPA auction are entirely consistent with the theoretical model. In the constant aggregate case the model predicts that average and market clearing prices should be near the lower bound of the CE price interval Ž . and below the CE interval midpoint , and the data support this prediction. In the random draws case the model predicts that many asks will be 1¢ and many bids will 16 Ž . This mean deviation is slightly higher in the final 4 periods 32¢ because of a substantial mean absolute deviation of 68¢ in the final period. Dropping period 24, the mean absolute deviation for the periods 17᎐23 is 26.4¢. The divergent behavior in the final period in both environments is probably due to end of experiment effects, because subjects knew the session would last exactly 24 periods. be in the range near the midpoint of the value distribution. This implies that most transaction prices will be near the midpoint of the value distribution, so that average prices exceed the CE price only when the CE price happens to be below the midpoint of the value distribution. The data also support this implication of the model. The CE price is below the midpoint of the value distribution in 11 of the 15 periods in which the average price exceeds the CE price, but the CE price is below the midpoint of the value distribution in 0 of the 9 periods in which the CE price exceeds the average price. In other words, average prices under the EPA auction rules are less responsive to changes in underlying market conditions than implied by the changing CE price.
17
The next two results concern the uniform price auctions and are standard to the literature. They demonstrate that the uniform price auction tends to induce value and cost revelation at the margin. This tendency increases over time and with experience. As a consequence the prices in the uniform price auction are close to the competitive equilibrium prices. Another way to demonstrate this point is to compare the CE price variance and average price variance across periods in the random draws case. The variance of theoretical CE prices is 540, while the variance of actual average prices in the EPA auctions is only 96. The variance of average prices in the uniform price auction is 439. 18 It is interesting that the asks generally revealed costs more completely than the bids revealed values. The Nash model of bid and ask behavior does not predict this result because it treats buyer and sellers symmetrically.
RESULT 10. In the uniform price auction, prices are near the competiti¨e equilibrium and mo¨e closer to the competiti¨e equilibrium o¨er time.
Support. Across all constant aggregate sessions, prices are within the CE price interval in 75% of the periods. In the more challenging random draws sessions, observed prices track CE prices fairly well. We employ the mean absolute price deviation from the CE as the statistic to document this price result. In the constant aggregate sessions, the mean absolute deviations of actual transaction prices from the CE price interval midpoints were 11.3¢, 7.5¢, and 9.1¢ in the first 8, second 8, w x and final 8 periods, respectively T-statistics s 2.56, 1.09 . In the random draws sessions, these deviations were 9.0¢, 7.6¢, and 9.3¢ in the first 8, second 8, and final w x 8 periods, respectively T-statistics s 0.53, 0.59 . Similar to the bid and ask behavior, prices do not immediately adjust to the new CE after the value and cost distributions shift between periods 16 and 17.
The substance of Results 6 through 10 is that the Nash equilibrium model for the constant aggregate case is a useful model for characterizing properties of both the constant aggregate and the random draws sessions. We therefore have confidence in the elbow and jump model for the EPA auction in spite of our inability to characterize it formally for the random draws environment. All 8 EPA auction sessions generate the same qualitative bid and ask patterns, so this model has strong empirical support. Furthermore, behavior in the uniform price auctions was consistent with previous laboratory studies and existing theoretical models. The next section provides additional analyses of bid and ask behavior.
Beha¨ior of Indi¨idual Bids and Asks
This final section presents individual bid and ask data from the random draws sessions to evaluate more carefully the bid and ask strategies suggested by the theoretical models. Because of learning this section reports data from periods 9 through 16ᎏafter an initial 8-period learning phase but before the shift in the underlying value and cost distributions. Results 11 and 12 provide stylized facts that will be useful in any assessment of how the EPA auction might perform under even more complex field environments. These results will also guide further theoretical work for the EPA auction institution in the random draws environment.
RESULT 11. In the EPA auction with random draws, the multiple unit discriminati¨e auction bidding strategies closely approximate the buyer beha¨ior.
Support. Figure 12 presents the bid for each value draw in periods 9᎐16 of the experienced EPA auction, random draws sessions. Over these periods buyers' bids reveal only 73.6% of the true valuations. The figure also indicates the theoretical w risk neutral bid functions for Q s 7 and Q s 8 units offered. The average number of units traded per period during these middle eight periods was 7.9 with a median x and mode of 7. We expect this model to provide an approximation to the buyers' strategy although it does not account for the endogeneity of the number of units offered by the strategic sellers. Judging from this figure this one-sided model appears to be a good approximation, even though neither the Q s 7 nor the Q s 8 theoretical bid functions are exactly appropriate given the uncertainty in the Ž number of units offered. The empirical bid function the figure also shows the OLS . estimate appears to asymptote in the correct price range, although bids in the value range between about 110 and 150 appear too high. 19 Because this equation is estimated precisely, an F-test rejects both the Q s 7 and Q s 8 risk neutral bid functions; however, the theoretical functions do provide a close approximation and bracket the observed equation.
RESULT 12. In the EPA auction with random draws, the sellers follow ask strategies that are qualitati¨ely similar to the jump strategy defined as part of a Nash equilibrium for the constant aggregate en¨ironment.
Support. Figure 13 presents the ask for each cost draw in the EPA auction, random draws sessions. Sellers enter a mass of 223 1¢ asks for costs below 125. Approximately 80% of the asks are 1¢ for units with cost draws less than or equal to 125, and two sellers submitted nearly all of the non-1¢ asks for these low-cost units. The risk of the 1¢ ask strategy appears minimal, as only 11 of the 223 1¢ asks Ž . in periods 9᎐16 5% resulted in a loss for the seller.
Result 13 concerns the uniform price institution with random draws, and evaluates the aggregate empirical bid and ask functions relative to the very precise theoretical predictions for this environment. 
CONCLUSION
The Environmental Protection Agency has created a unique call auction institution for trading sulfur dioxide emission allowances. The major difference between the EPA auction institution and more traditional call auctions is that successful buyers pay their bid price and successful sellers receive the bid price of some specific buyer. This research examines the implications of this particular call auction procedure.
The primary conclusion of this experiment is that these auction rules create strong incentives for both buyers and sellers to under-report their true cost of emissions control to the auction. Consequently, compared to more standard uniform price call auctions, the EPA auction generates lower market-clearing prices and extracts less gains from exchange. Efficiency increases over time in the uniform price auction but not in the EPA auction. The EPA auction is also less responsive to and recovers slowly from changes in underlying market conditions. The prices reported in the EPA auction, having been modified by its strategic considerations, are less accurate reflections of the true economic circumstances than are the prices reported in the uniform price auction. This shortcoming is important because emissions trading is expected to provide valuable information to utilities. Utilities need accurate and timely information concerning the market value of emission allowances to ensure cost-effective investments in emission control.
The EPA auction interacts with other markets, but to date no other centralized markets have evolved for these emission allowances in spite of encouragement by the EPA. A small number of privately brokered trades have occurred, but it would be unfortunate to rely on this kind of trading because of the significant transactions costs of search and bilateral negotiation. The annual EPA auction is the best Ž opportunity for low transaction cost trading, but the two auctions held to date in . March of 1993 and 1994 were successful only in the public relations sense. Virtually no trades occurred other than for the mandatory units withheld by the EPA, a tiny fraction of the overall trading volume needed for substantial cost savings from tradable allowances. Prices for 1995 allowances typically ranged between $140 and $150, well below most analysts' expectations and below the $180 to $200 price range observed for allowances traded through private negotiation Ž w x. Allowance Market Monitor 1 . The slow development of this market is undoubtedly due to a variety of reasonsᎏincluding regulatory uncertainty and political constraints ᎏbut we believe that it is substantially handicapped by the unique auction rules studied here.
Important theoretical issues remain unresolved. In general, the EPA auction is too complicated to solve with the classical techniques of auction theory. Closed form bidding functions for the random draws environment have not been obtained, and numerical methods could not be applied successfully because of the complexity of this auction process. Nevertheless, we do obtain theoretical solutions for the special case considered in the constant aggregate environment, and the data support this model. This special case and models derived from simplifying assumptions also generate theoretical predictions for the more complex random draws case, and these implications are also supported by the data. However, additional theoretical work is needed.
Important historical and practical issues also remain open. Why did the EPA create such an unusual auction process, and is it possible to change the auction rules? The following quote suggests that the discriminative auction rules are a result of an EPA interpretation of the Act perhaps guided by faulty intuition about the nature of auction processes: 21 w x EPA interprets this provision of the Act to require that allowances be sold to successful Ž . bidders at the price of their respective bids also referred to as a discriminative approach . As a result, the total proceeds of each auction, which are to be paid to the initial allowance-holders, will be greater than they would be if bidders were required to pay only the Ž . auction-clearing price or lowest successful bid price regardless of the stated price in their respective bids. This outcome appears consistent with the statutory requirement that Ž . allocation proceeds be transferred to original allowance-holders emphasis added .
Ironically, the research reported here suggests that the rules adopted by the EPA have an impact that is opposite of their intent, because buyers bid lower in 21 w x Federal Register 7 , page 23746. discriminative auctions. The EPA was aware that ''such a system may provide incentives for holders of allowances to specify lower minimum prices for allowances than they would be willing to accept in order to be matched to higher bids. '' 22 However, it seems unlikely that the EPA was aware of the full implications of these rules. Not only do the rules foster lower market-clearing prices than either competitive levels or prices that would be generated under more standard auction rules, but the rules foster several other undesirable side effects.
Can the rules be changed? The language of the Clean Air Act states that allowances ''shall be sold on the basis of bid price.'' However, the Act does not explicitly state that prices must be set equal to the different bid prices and the language does not exclude the possibility that the ask price be part of the price determination equation. Indeed, transaction prices are determined by both the bid and ask prices in the current EPA auction rules. If this statement of the Act is sufficiently ambiguousᎏwhich is a legal rather than economic questionᎏthen the doctrine of judicial deference allows the EPA to employ any reasonable statutory interpretation in setting up the auction. 23 Because of the absence of any further restraining language it would seem that the uniform price auction rules are consistent with the Act. Our recommendation is that the EPA seriously consider adopting alternative rules such as the uniform price auction institution.
